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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
EARL ALLEN v. STEPHEN L. HARDY ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-6593.

Decided June - , 1986

PER CURIAM.

In 1978, petitioner Earl Allen, a black man, was indicted
for murdering his girlfriend and her brother. During selection of the petit jurors at petitioner's trial, the prosecutor
exercised 9 of the State's 17 peremptory challenges to strike
7 black and 2 Hispanic veniremen. Defense counsel moved
to discharge the jury on the ground that the "'State's use of
peremptory challenges undercut [petitioner's] right to an impartial jury selected from a cross-section of the community
by systematically excluding minorities from the petit jury.'"
People v. Allen. 96 Ill. App. 3d 871, 875. 422 N. E. 2d 100.
104 (1981). The trial judge denied the motion. The jury
convicted petitioner on both counts, and the judge sentenced
him to two concurrent prison terms of from 100 to 300 years.
On appeal, petitioner repeated his argument concerning
the State's exercise of peremptory challenges. Rel};ng on
Swain v. Alabama. 380 U. S. 202 (1965). and on Illinois case
law decided under Swain. the Illinois Appellate Court
rejected the argument. The court reasoned that in the
absence of a showing that prosecutors in the jurisdiction
systematically were using their challenges to strike members
of a particular racial group, "a prosecutor's motives may not
be inquired into when he excludes members of that group
from sitting on a particular case by the use of peremptory
challenges." 96 Ill. App. 3d, at 875, 422 N. E. 2d. at 104.
The record in this case did not establish systematic exclusion
as required by Swain. /d., at 876, 422 N. E. 2d, at 104.
The court therefore affirmed petitioner's convictions. I d., at
880, 422 N. E. 2d, at 107.
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Petitioner then filed a t't'
1 1011
lief in the District C
for federal habeas corpus reon which he renew do~~ or the Northern District of Illinois,
of peremptot ch e JS argument c~ncerning the State's use
""! allenges. Construmg this at·gument as al1 .
e:~l:~;~ 1Y ~hat .P~osecutor~ in. the jurisdiction systematically ""·
..
~mon~tes from Junes, the District Court denied
petl.tiOner .s mot10n. ~or discovery to support the claim, and
demed rehef. PetltJOner's failure at trial "to make even an
offer .of proof" to satisfy the evidentiary standard of Swain
constituted a procedut·al default for which petitioner had offered no excuse. 577 F. Supp. 984, 986 (ND Ill. 1984); sec
583 F. Supp. 562 (ND Ill. 1984). In a subsequent opinion,
the District Court also considered and rejected petitioner's
contention that the State's exercise of its peremptory challenges at his trial violated the Sixth Amendment. 586 F.
Supp. 103~4-106 (1984). Moreover, noting that the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had "twice within the past
60 days reconfirmed the continuing validity of Swain," the
decision on which the orders in this case rested, the District
Court declined to issue a certificate of probable cause.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, which the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit construed as an application
for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Finding that
petitioner failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial
of a federal right" or that the questions he sought to raise
"deserve[d] further proceedings," the court. denied the
request for a certificate of probable cause.
In his petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that the
Court of Appeals' refusal to issue a certificate of probable
cause was erroneous in view of the fact that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. - - (1986), was pending before us at the
time of the Court of Appeals' decision. The thrust of petitioner's argument is that the rule in Batson should be available to him as a ground for relief on remand. We conclude
that our decision in Batson should not be applied retroac-
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CotWtcltnnH that bt•t•:mw final be
1 I .
lOll WaH :\llllOUlll'l'ti, and Wl' t hen• ron• '\l'linn 1
n c l'<'H. Ill.~. t ht• l'Xi<'lll to whil'h a d<'<'iHion ·mnt.nmcin.v, '\

lll~W <.'<>ttt~tttutt~m;tlt·ul<• of ct·imiual pt·ot·l·dun• :,\l;oul<l be v,ivP~\
•:P n>ac JH' t•ftct't. the <..' mut lt·nditionnlly hat-~ Wl'i~lwd thn•c

tact or~. Th<•v 'll'<' .. '(· ) tl
•
. •
.1 1<' PIII'JHIH<' to be :o~t•rvcd by Lhc new
standanl~
(b) til"
l'Xt<'tlt l(' tl
J'
b 1
·.
. • '
'" ·
(
H' l'l' IHI\Ct' Y HW l'lll<WCt'll\Pill
at~t~ontt~'R on the old statulanls, aud (l')
l•ITt•d on Llw ad
UlUH~tratwn of ju.stic<.' of:\ l'{~tmal'liVl' upplit-ation nf Ilw tll'W
standm·d.s."' Solem v. Sttwtc~. 4G5 U . H. u:~H. ().\a (tmH)
(q.uoting StoN11/ v. D<'uno, :lHH u. 8. ~n:~. ~n7 (1BH7)); Rcc
l~mklcftt•J· v. Walkt•t, :381 U. s. HtH, Han (H)( if>). While a dcciHion on t·ctroactivity t'<'quircs t•an•fnl l'Ou:.;idl•t·at.ion of all
thrNl critet·ia, the Court has held thn.t n deci:.;ion announdnga tww ~tandm·d "i~ almo~t automatically nom·Ptrom·tiv<.•"
where the dc<:iHion "ha:.; explicitly ovenulc;i pllirt'prccc<l<.·nt."
Solt'm v. Slunu's, .•wpta, at ().Hi, H·l7. The ntlc in 8ut~o11 v. /
Kentucky i~ an t•xplicit and sub~tantial br<'ak with prior
p1·ecedent. In Swain v. .·\labcww, tlw Cmu-t hl'ld that. although the u~c of pl'I'CmptoJ·y challeng-es to st 1·ikc blaek jurors on account uf race violated the F~qual P1·ot t!dion Clau~l:,
a def(1 11dant rould not establish such a violation solely on

u; . .

proof of the p1·osccutm·'s a<.'t ion at his QWn trial. aHO U. H.•
at 220-226. Ual:wn oveJ'I'Ul<.>d that portion of Stm.iu. <.'hang- /
ing the standard fm· proving uncon:.;tituUonal ahust• of peremptory challenges. Against that bacl<grouncl, Wt' considl'l'
whether the standard announced in Uatsu11 ~hould lw avail·
able on habcaH review of petitionct·'H mm·dt!t' <:onvictionH.
11

By final wt• mt'llll wht•t't' tht• judgnwnt of t•nu\'id ion wng l'l'lldt•J'I'd, t ht•
availability nfapp('al t•xhaustt'd, and t.lw timt> for pt>tiliun 1'<11' t•t•rtiur:u·i ha<l
elapsc•d bcfor(• out· df•tiHion in" 1/ttl.•wn v. 1\rnluck!/. /,lltk/,•ff,•r v. \Valkt•r,
/
:~1 (). S. fHH, fi~~. n. r; ( WfiG). Wt.' l'XJll't!HH no vit·w nn llw qut•Ht inn \
wh<!thcr our dt•ciHion in llttfson Hhoulcl lw applit•tl to t•mws that wt•t't' twncl ing on dirc•t·t nppt•al at Uw tinw cnu· clt•t·ision wa1-1 annouru.~t·cl. Ht•P Urlj)itlt
v. Kntlurky, No. H!) f,~~l (c«'rt. grantt•cl .hull• :!, HIHCi), antl Hm/1'11 v.
Uuilnl Slalt•,..,, H!i - fi7:H (t•c•t·t. grantt•ci.Junt! ~. l!)Hfi).
'
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The first factor concerns the
new rule. Retroa t·
~
.purpose to be served by the
c
Ive
e.uect
Is "a
. t e where a new
ppropr1a
constitutional princi 1 . d .
criminal trials " S l p e Is esigned to enhance the accm:ac~ <>f
that a rule m;, o em v. St~mes, supra, at 643, but the fact
Y have some Impact on the accuracy of a trial
d
oes not compel a finding of retroactivity. I d., at 643-645.
In~tead ~ the purpose to be served by the new standard
weighs m favor of retroactivity where the standard "goes to
the ~eart of ~h~ truthfinding function.'' I d., at 645. By
ser~g a crlllllnal defendant's interest in neutral jury
~election procedures, the rule in Batson may have some bear- I
mg on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial. But the
decision serves other values as well. Our holding ensures
that States do not discriminate against citizens who are summoned to sit in judgment against a membe"r of their own race
and strengthens public confidence in the administration of
justice. The rule in Batson, therefore, was designed "to
7I
serve ID.!illiPJe ends," only the first of which may have some \
""
impact on truthtinding. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S.
323, 329 (1980); see also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U. S. 406, 414 (1966). Significantly, the new rule joins
other procedures that protect a defendant's interest in a neu2
tral factfinder. Those other mechanisms existed prior to
our decision in Batson, creating a high probability that the
individual jurors seated in a particular case were free from
bias. Accordingly, we cannot say that the new rule has such .;
a fyndam.ental impact on the integrity of factfinding as to
compel retroactive application.
Moreover, the factors concerning reliance on the old rule
and the effect of retroactive application on the administration
of justice weigh heavily in favor of nonretroactive effect. As
2

Voir dire examination is designed to identify veniremen who are
biased so that those persons may be excused through challenges for cause.
Moreover, the jury charge typically includes instructions emphasizing that
the jurors must not rest their decision on any impennissible factor, such as
passion or prejudice.
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noted above Batson not
standard of Swai 1·t 1 on1Y overruled the evidentiary
significant!
n,
a so announced a new standard that
d {! d
Y changes the burden of proof imposed on both
e en ant ~nd prosecutor. There is no question that prosecutors tr1al J. udges
d
'
, an appe11ate courts tlu·oughout our
state and fe?eral
systems justifiably have relied on the stand3
ard of Swa-m . Indeed, the decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court affirming petitioner's convictions and of the Distri~t Court denying habeas corpus relief clearly illustrate the
reliance lower courts placed on Swain. Under these circumstances, the reliance interest of law enforcement officials is
"compelling" and supports a decision that the new rule should
not be retroactive. Solem v. Stumes, supra, at 650.
Similarly, retroactive application of the Batson rule on collateral review of final convictions would seriously disrupt the
administration of justice. Retroactive application would require trial courts to hold hearings, often years after the conviction became final, to determine whether the defendant's /
proof concerning the prosecutor's exercise of challenges established a prima facie case of discrimination. Where a defendant made out a prima facie case, the court then would be
required to ask the prosecutor to explain his reasons for the
challenges, a task that would be impossible in virtually every
case since the prosecutor, relying on Swain, would have had
no reason to think such an explanation would someday be
necessary.
Many final convictions therefore would be
vacated, with retrial "hampered by problems of lost evidence, faulty memory, and missing witnesses.'' Solem v.
Stumes, supra, at 650; see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U. S., at 637.
Our weighing of the pertinent criteria compels the conclusion that the rule in Batson should not be available to peti1

The substantial reliance by lower courts on the standard in Swain has
been fully documented elsewhere. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S.
- , - , n. 1 0986); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1118, 1120, n. 2 (CA2
1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426.
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tioner on federal habeas corpus review of his convictions.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.~
Affirmed.
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In his petition for certiorari, petitioner also argues that the District
Court erroneously denied him discovery on his claim that prosecutors systematically had excluded minorities from petit juries in the jurisdiction.
In effect, the District Court held that, by making no offer of proof on this
claim, petitioner's bare objection failed to preserve the claim for review.
Since petitioner points to no Illinois authority casting doubt on the District
Court's conclusion that, at the least, an offer of proof was necessary to
preserve the issue, we have no reason to question the District Court's conclusion that the claim was waived. Similarly, the District Court properly
determined that petitioner was required to, and did not, establish cause
and prejudice excusing his default. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S.
72 (1977).

